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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. ; 
ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON, J 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
i Case No. 960388-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 as 
Amended), and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The overriding issue presented here is: Whether the trial 
court erred in denying Thompson's Motion to Suppress the Evidence 
on grounds that the search and seizure of Thompson was 
unconstitutional. Appellate review for the denial of such a 
motion is conducted in a biforcated manner—the trial court's 
subsidiary and factual determinations are reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard while its legal conclusions are 
reviewed for "correctness". See State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah App. 1994). However, "the final determination of 
lawfulness of a detention or search is reviewed for correctness." 
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 1993). 
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More specifically Thompson presents for appellate review the 
following issue arising from the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the 
detention and subsequent search of Thompson were conducted to 
secure the arrest scene or for officer safety pursuant to the 
constitutional requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(1968) and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). 
This isssue was preserved for appeal by a Conditional Plea 
Agreement (R. 55-58), a written Motion to Suppress (R. 21) 
accompanied by a Memoranda of Points and Authorities (R. 15-19, 
34-40), and a Suppression Hearing (R. 78-155). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-16 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if 
he reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Robert Wells Thompson, entered a conditional 
plea of "guilty" to Possession of Marijuana and Possession of 
Methamphetamine, both third degree felonies, in Fourth District 
Court. Thompson now appeals the trial court's denial of his 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
Thompson was charged with three counts of controlled 
substance violations which allegedly occurred on the evening of 
December 17, 1995, when Thompson was detained, searched, and 
questioned at the residence of Timothy Lamoreaux, for whom the 
police had come to arrest (R. 9). Following arraignment in 
district court before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Thompson 
filed a motion to suppress challenging the detention, search and 
questioning which resulted in the criminal charges (R. 14, 15-
21). 
On February 14, 1996, an evidentiary hearing was held on 
Thompson's motion (R. 31, 78-155). At the close of the hearing 
Judge Burningham took the matter under advisement (R. 31). After 
the receipt of supplemental pleadings, Judge Burningham denied 
Thompson's motion and ruled that the actions of the law 
enforcement personnel in detaining and searching Thompson were 
appropriate in order to secure the scene of Timothy Lamoreaux's 
arrest and pursuant to a Terry frisk (R. 43-45, 47-48). 
Following the denial of Thompson's Motion to Suppress, he 
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entered a conditional plea of guilty to Possession of Marijuana 
with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, and Possession 
of Methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R. 57-58, 156-71). 
The Conditional Plea Agreement and Certification was filed in the 
Fourth District Court on April 15, 1996 (R. 59-61); and on May 8, 
1996, Thompson was sentenced to thirty-six months probation (R. 
62-64, 172-180). On June 6, 1996, Thompson filed a Notice of 
Appeal and this action commenced (R. 72). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 17, 1995, Officer Bud Walker and Officer Dray 
Savage of the Provo City Police Department attempted to serve an 
arrest warrant on Timothy Lamoreaux (R. 82, 84). The officers 
went to Lamoreaux's home at 6:30 p.m., made contact with his 
sister, but were not able to serve him at that time (R. 82-83). 
The officers returned to Lamoreaux's home at approximately 
8:15 p.m. (R. 83, 109). Upon arrival at the home, Officer Savage 
advised Officer Walker that he observed Lamoreaux in the house 
with another individual (R. 85, 109, 110). The officers called 
for assistance and then Savage went to watch the back door while 
Walker remained out front (R. 85, 110). 
Shortly after the officers separated, Lamoreaux and the 
Defendant, Robert Thompson, exited the home (R. 86). Officer 
Walker momentarily placed himself behind a tree to avoid 
detection by the individuals before the completely left the house 
because he did not want to create an issue of officer safety by 
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causing them to return to the house (R. 87). As Lamoreaux and 
Thompson walked down the sidewalk Walker made contact with them 
and advised Lamoreaux that he had a warrant for his arrest (R. 
87). 
Lamoreaux was then immediately placed under arrest while 
Thompson moved away (R. 88, 102-03). As Thompson walked around 
to the northwest side of the trailer, he encountered Officer 
Savage, who confronted Thompson and instructed him to return to 
Officer Walker's location because Savage was concerned about 
officer safety (R. 91, 112-13, 120). At this point, Savage could 
not see Walker (R. 120). 
Thompson followed Savage's instruction and returned to 
Walker's location in the front of the home but kept a constant 
distance of approximately 15 feet from where Walker stood with 
Lamoreaux (R. 92, 113-14). Shortly after, Officer Savage joined 
him in the front of the house and he began to interrogate 
Thompson while Walker continued to converse with Lamoreaux (R. 
103. 114-15, 121-22). Savage testified that Thompson appeared 
nervous, that he kept one hand in his pocket, and that he walked 
around the scene (R. 115). Savage further clarified that he 
suspected no "criminal activity" on the part of Thompson just 
"suspicious activity" (R. 123). 
Finally, Officer Savage asked Thompson for permission to 
search his person for weapons (R. 104, 116). Thompson refused to 
consent to a voluntary search (R. 93, 105, 116). Savage did 
nothing in response when Thompson began to walk away because "it 
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was Officer Walker's investigation and I was just going to stand 
there and contain the scene, and Officer Walker was going to make 
contact with that individual" (R. 18, 125; 116). Nor did either 
officer tell him to stop (R. 107), but they refused to let 
Thompson leave although Lamoreaux had been secured in hand-cuffs. 
Officer Walker then asked Thompson if he had anything on his 
person that would hurt the officer, and Thompson did not respond 
(R. 93, 105). Walker then left Lamoreaux and walked 7-10 feet to 
Thompson, placed his arm on Thompson's shoulder and repeated the 
question while Thompson tried to move away (R. 93, 105-06). 
Thompson allegedly responded "Yes" to the question (R. 93). 
Thompson was then seized by Walker, positioned up against a car, 
and involuntarily pat-searched (R. 94). During the pat-down, 
Walker testified that he felt a metallic object in Thompson's 
front coat pocket and that he found marijuana and other drug 
paraphernalia (R. 94-95). However, Walker did not remove any of 
these items because he "felt that they were drugs" and his "main 
concern was weapons" (R. 95). The metallic object was a scale 
(R. 96). 
Walker again asked Thompson if he had anything on his person 
that would hurt the officer and Thompson replied that he had 
"syringes" (R. 95). Walker then asked if there were drugs and 
Thompson responded that methamphetamine had been in the syringes 
(R. 95). Walker located the syringes on the inside portion of 
the jacket and then continued to search for weapons (R. 95-96). 
Eventually Walker had Thompson remove his coat, and placed him in 
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hand-cuffs before putting both Thompson and Lamoreaux in the 
patrol car (R. 96). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Individuals have the constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons. 
Investigatory stops are protected under both the United States 
and the Utah constitutions. If a person is detained in a level 
two encounter with police officers, such a detention must be 
justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Any 
evidence obtained from such a detention without a suspicion of 
criminal activity must be suppressed unless an exception to the 
exclusionary rule is applicable. 
In this case, there was no suspicion that Thompson was 
engaging in criminal activity when he was seized by the police 
officers who were present to arrest Lamoreaux. Accordingly, the 
evidence obtained as a result of that seizure and the subsequent 
search of Thompson should have been suppressed unless the State 
could establish an exception to the exclusionary rule. Here, the 
trial court erred in concluding that the State had met such a 
burden: There is no recognized exception automatically 
justifying a "search" as part of the need for officers to "secure 
and arrest scene"; and in this case, the requirements of Terry v. 
Ohio for an "officer safety" frisk were not present. Accordingly 
Thompson asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SEIZURE AND SEARCH 
OF THOMPSON WAS JUSTIFIED BY EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution both secure "the right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." Thompson 
asserts that the evidence which formed the basis for his 
conditional plea of guilt should have been suppressed because it 
was obtained as a result of an illegal detention and search. 
The search and seizure limitations of both the Fourth 
Amendment and article If § 14 are applicable to investigatory 
stops or seizures that are not official arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); State v. Truiillo 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 
App. 1987). The Utah Supreme Court has defined three levels of 
police-citizen which require different degrees of justification 
to be constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). 
8 
In this case there is no dispute that the detention of 
Thompson was a level two seizure requiring reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity (R. 126, 136-37). 
Unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies, absent 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, evidence derived from 
the detention is "fruits of the poisonous tree." State v. Baird, 
763 P.2d 1214, 1216, 1217 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). 
In this case the State did not argue that there was 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Thompson was engaged 
involved in criminal activity (R. 129). Moreover, Officer Savage 
admitted that he suspected no "criminal activity" on the part of 
Thompson (R. 123). 
Therefore, in order for the State to have justified the 
detention and subsequent search of Thompson's person, they had to 
demonstrate that an exception to the exclusionary rule was 
applicable to this case. Thompson asserts that thehe trial court 
committed reversible error in its conclusion that the search of 
Thompson was justified as a part of an "officer's necessity to 
secure an arrest scene" or because of "officer safety" as 
dileneated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and State v. 
White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). 
A. The Trial Court Erred in its Conclusion that the Search of 
Thompson was Automatically Justifiable because of the 
State's Need to Secure an Arrest Scene. 
At the suppression hearing the State relied on an assertion 
that the officers had a right to detain and search Thompson in 
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order to secure the scene pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968) and its prodigy (R. 129, 136-38). However, neither the 
State during argument, nor the Court in its ruling, cited any 
meaningful case law to support the conclusion the right to search 
everyone present in order to secure an arrest scene. 
The closest argument which would support the State's 
position is the "automatic companion" rule which was discussed in 
dictum in United States v.Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th 
Cir. 1971), which suggested that an arresting officer is always 
justified in a protective search of an arrestee's companion. 
However, the language in Berryhill has been subsequently 
criticized no only by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which 
initially decided the case, but also by other federal circuit 
courts.1 Moreover, the State itself acknowledged that it was not 
arguing for application of Berryhill's absolute rule in this case 
(R. 25). Furthermore, if the officer's had the right to search 
everyone present at the scene of an arrest regardless of whether 
there was reasonable suspicion, it would give officers unbridled 
ability to search any number of people who may be present while 
the officers are effectuating the arrest of one singular person. 
Accordingly, Thompson asks that this court correct the trial 
court's conclusion that "securing an arrest scene" constituted an 
exception to the exclusionary rule. 
xSee United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Tharoe, 526 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Bell, 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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B. The Trial Court Erred in its Conclusion that the Detention 
and Subsequent Pat-Search of Thompson was Lawful Pursuant to 
the Guidelines set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 
Unlike "securing an arrest scene", a frisk for weapons may 
be an exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214, 1217 n. 2 (Utah App. 1993). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a frisk 
following an investigatory stop would be justified to enable 
police officers to protect themselves against potentially 
dangerous suspects. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659-60 (Utah 
App. 1993). "Each frisk," however, "must be 'justified at its 
inception, and ... reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place." White, 856 P.2d at 660 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
The Terry Court specifically held that a frisk was 
reasonable and justified: "(1) 'where a police officer observes 
unusual conduct' which he interprets 'in light of his experience' 
as indicating possible criminal activity and present danger, (2) 
'where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies 
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and (3) 
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or other's safety.'" White, 856 P.2d 
at 660 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). In other words, an 
officer is justified in making such a frisk if "a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger." White, 856 
P.2d at 660 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Furthermore in 
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making a determination of "reasonableness" the need to search 
should be balanced against the invasion which the search entails. 
White, 856 P.2d at 661; Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21. 
In this case while the officers both testified repeatedly 
that the reason for the detention and the frisk of Thompson was 
becauset they were concerned for their safety, their actions 
demonstrate otherwise. Walker allowed Thompson to walk away 
while he was hand-cuffing Lamoreaux without comment (R. 88, 102-
03). When Savage encountered Thompson for the first time he did 
not frisk Thompson, he simply told him to return to Walker, whom 
he could not see (R. 91, 112-13, 120). Moreover, Savage did not 
immediately accompany Thompson back to the front of the trailer 
(R. 103). 
In addition, when Thompson returned to the front area, 
Walker, who was conversing with an arrested Lamoreaux, did not 
immediately confront Thompson but continued to converse with 
Lamoreaux while Savage asked Thompson for identification and 
permission to search his person for weapons (R. 104, 114-16). 
Furthermore, Savage himself did not frisk Thompson nor did he 
respond when Thompson began to move away because "it was Officer 
Walker's investigation and I was just going to stand there and 
contain the scene, and Officer Walker was going to make contact 
with that individual" (R. 18, 125; 116). It was not until all of 
this took place that Walker frisked Thompson. 
There was nothing in Walker or Savage's conduct which 
indicates that they were actually concerned with their safety as 
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required by Terry prior to the commission of a weopans frisk. 
Moreover, by the time Walker got around to searching Thompson, 
any possible concern for officer safety had dissipated by a lack 
of suspicious activity by Thompson, who simply wanted to leave 
the scene. A Terry frisk "must be 'justified at its inception, 
and ... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." White, 856 P.2d 
at 660 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
Finally, the need to search Thompson, whose only relation to 
the justification for the officer's presence was his proximity to 
Lamoreaux, when balanced against the lengthy and intrusive 
seizure and search he encountered, renders the officers actions 
unreasonable and unjustifiable. Accordingly, Thompson asks this 
Court to correct the trial court's erroneous conclusion that the 
detention and search of Thompson was a lawful Terry search. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the aforementioned reasons, this court should find that 
Thompson was illegially seized and searched and that the trial 
court erred in its conclusions that the officers activity in 
detaining and frisking Thompson was lawful. Accordingly, 
Thompson requests that this Court, because there was no 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of 
Thompson, reverse and remand this case to the Fourth District 
Court with directions to suppress the evidence and dismiss the 
charges. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this r \ day of October, 1996. 
Mcfrgare^ Lindsay /f 
Attorney for Thompson u 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid to the 
Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division, Heber Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, on the < day of October, 1996. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 961400017 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Defendant, ROBERT W. THOMPSON, through his counsel of record, Randall K. 
Spencer, moves the Court to suppress evidence gathered subsequent to the unlawful seizure 
and search of Defendant which resulted in the charges in the present case. Defendant's 
motion is made pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, and the accompanying memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of Defendant's motion. 
Dated this ^ 3 day of January, 1996. 
idall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office 
of the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ^ ^ 
day rtdtMMMAd* 1996. 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 961400017 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Defendant, ROBERT W. THOMPSON, through his counsel of record, Randall K. 
Spencer, submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about December 17, 1995, Officer Walker and Officer Savage of the Provo 
City Police Department attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Timothy A. Lamoreaux. 
The officers went to Mr. Lamoreaux's home at 6:30 p.m., made contact with Mr. 
Lamoreaux's sister, but were not able to serve Mr. Lamoreaux. 
2. Officer Walker and Officer Savage returned to Mr. Lamoreaux's home at 
approximately 8:15 p.m. 
3. After arriving at the home the second time, Officer Savage advised Officer Walker 
that he observed Mr. Lamoreaux in the home with another individual. 
4. The officers called for back-up, and Officer Savage went to watch the back door 
while Officer Walker remained out front. 
5. Shortly after the officers separated, Mr. Lamoreaux and Defendant exited the 
home. 
6. Officer Walker made contact with Mr. Lamoreaux and Defendant and advised Mr. 
Lamoreaux that he had a warrant for his arrest. 
7. Defendant walked away, and went around the house, and coincidentally bumped 
into Officer Savage. Officer Savage confronted Defendant and instructed him to return to 
Officer Walker's location. 
8. Defendant followed Officer Savage's instruction and returned to Officer Walker's 
location in the front of the home, and was followed shortly after by Officer Savage. 
9. Officer Savage and Officer Walker began to interrogate both Defendant and Mr. 
Lamoreaux. 
10. Defendant made repeated attempts to walk away from the officers, but was not 
allowed to do so. 
11. Officer Savage asked Defendant if he had anything on his person that would be of 
concern to us, and asked if he could search Defendant. Defendant stated that he did not have 
anything on his person that would concern the officers, and that they could not search him 
voluntarily; after answering the officer's questions, Defendant began to walk away. 
12. Mr. Lamoreaux was secured in hand-cuffs, and the officers refused to allow 
Defendant to leave notwithstanding his numerous attempts to do so. 
13. Officer Walker subsequently asked Defendant if he had anything on his person that 
would hurt the officer, and Defendant did not respond. 
14. Officer Walker approached Defendant, and Defendant again attempted to leave the 
officer's presence. 
15. Officer Walker seized Defendant and began to pat him down, and Defendant turned 
and attempted to pull away. 
16. Officer Walker grabbed Defendant firmly by the hand and asked him if he had 
anything on his person that would hurt the officer. Defendant stated yes, and Officer Walker 
made Defendant place his hands on a car which was parked in the driveway and searched 
Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution contains nearly the same language as the federal 
constitution. Defendant was stopped and searched illegally under both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. 
The search and seizure limitations of the fourth amendment and article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution are applicable to investigatory stops or seizures that are not official 
arrests. State v. Truiillo 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). When a person remains not in 
the spirit of cooperation with an officer, but because he believes that he is not free to leave, 
a seizure has occurred. IcL In the present case, Officer Walker confronted Defendant and 
Mr. Lamoreaux for the purpose of serving an arrest warrant on Mr. Lamoreaux. Rather 
than stay and talk with the officer, Defendant walked away and attempted to leave the 
officer's presence. However, Defendant was confronted by Officer Savage and was 
instructed to return to the location of Officer Walker, and Defendant complied with the 
instruction. Subsequently, Officer Savage and Officer Walker attempted to question 
Defendant, and he repeatedly attempted to leave, but was not allowed to do so. Defendant 
was seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment at the time that Officer Savage 
confronted him while Defendant was attempting to leave, and the seizure continued while 
Officer Savage and Officer Walker questioned Defendant after Defendant had repeatedly 
attempted to leave. Therefore, the encounter between the officers and Defendant was a level 
two encounter requiring reasonable suspicion. See State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah 
App. 1992) (citing four cases from this jurisdiction which had suspicious facts but did not 
amount to reasonable suspicion to seize the defendants). 
The officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant against his will. 
The officers purpose which lead to the encounter with Defendant was to serve an arrest 
warrant on Mr. Lamoreaux, and Defendant happened to be with Mr. Lamoreaux when the 
officers located him. The officers had no reasonable suspicion that Defendant was involved 
in any criminal activity. At the time that Defendant was seized, the only articulable 
suspicion the officers had of Defendant was that he was associating with a person who was 
the subject of an arrest warrant. "[Defendant's mere presence in an area suspected to 
harbor drug activity [or with a person suspected of criminal activity] does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was engaged in such activity." Sykes, 840 P.2d at 829 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, a person approached consistent with a level one stop "is 
not required to answer the officer's questions, [sic] and his refusal to listen to the officer's 
questions or answer them, without more, does not furnish reasonable grounds for further 
detention. Truiillo. 739 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). Therefore, the officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
level two stop of Defendant, and all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must 
be suppressed. 
Dated this J S day of January, 1996 
(\L±Mt 
Randall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office 
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day rt^tLmJJdd-, 1996. 
v 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JOHN L. ALLAN #5122 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 E. Center, Suite 2100 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ! 
P l a i n t i f f , j 
v s . 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON 
D e f e n d a n t . 
c MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
t DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
i Case No. 961400017 
J u d g e Guy R. Burningham 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On Decembei I'"
 ( 1 y 95 iil 6 : 3 0 j: > in , Of f; I «cer Bur.I 
of the Provo City Police Department Attempted to Serve an arrest 
warrant on Timothy A, Lamoreaux at 255 N. 1600 W. i n Provo. 
2 . A t tin. is l o c a t i o n Of f ioei W H I lu i niacin- c o n t a c t w:l tiJri 
Timothy Lamoreaux's sister who was generally uncooperative and 
Officer Walker believed she was concealing Timothy Lamoreaux's 
whereabouts. 
3. Officer Walker and Officer Dray Savage returned to this 
location that same evening at 8:15 p.m. in an unmarked car to 
observe the location and serve Lamoreaux, 
4. Officers Walker and Savage learned that a warrant had 
issued for the arrest of Lamoreaux for felony distribution of drugs. 
5. Officer Savage saw the defendant with Lamoreaux inside 
the home through a window of a well lit bedroom, 
6. Officer Savage went to the rear of the home to cover the 
back door as Officer Walker approached the front door to make 
contact with Lamoreaux, 
7. Before Officer Walker reached the front door the 
defendant and Lamoreaux exited the home. 
8. Officer Walker confronted the two men and informed 
Lamoreaux that he had a warrant for his arrest. 
9. As Officer Walker was placing handcuffs on Lamoreaux, 
the defendant hurriedly walked towards the rear of the house. 
10. Officer Savage made contact with the defendant and 
noticed that he was nervous, evasive and wearing a jacket. 
11. Officer Savage advised the defendant to return to 
Officer Walker's location following which the defendant returned 
to the front of the home. 
12. While being interviewed the defendant continued to be 
nervous and evasive and made attempts to walk away from the 
officers. 
13. A search of Lamoreaux's clothing yielded a marijuana 
pipe and a baggie of marijuana. 
14. The defendant was subsequently and involuntarily pat-
searched by Officer Walker. 
15. During the pat-search the defendant told Officer Walker 
that he (the defendant) had syringes in his coat. 
2 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
The defendant has niuvexi l lie iijurl In suppress all evidence 
gathered subsequent to his seizure pursuant to the search and 
seizure clauses of the United States Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) and 1:1: le Uta 1: i Consti t/utii on (Article I, se :tion :i 4) . 
The defendant asserts that a seizure occurred when Officer Savage 
made contact with the defendant in the rear of the home. The 
defendant argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 
detain the defendant at any point during the encounter. The 
defendant's motion and its supporting arguments are without 
merit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POLICE CAN DETAIN A SUSPECT BASED ON REASONABLE SUSPICION 
OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OR THAT THE SUSPECT MAY BE ARMED. 
Bot: h !:; he 111 -J I! "'oust: I L lit, 1 on a rid t he United States 
Constitution allow for police detention of citizens based on the 
standard of reasonable suspicion. In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968), the united States Supreme Court established that any 
time the police are involved in a criminal investigation they can 
legally detain and pat-search anyone whom they reasonably suspect 
1.1.) be iirmed ami a t,hti:a\ [ I IIP Hrifet} of tr IIH i police In Florida 
v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 502# the United States Supreme Court held 
that the police could legally detain a citizen for questioning 
based on a reasonable suspici on til: lat the person i s :i nvol ved :i n 
3 
criminal activity. 
Utah Code 77-7-15 states that the police can stop and detain 
any citizen whom the police reasonably suspect to be involved in 
criminal activity. Utah Code 77-7-16 states that the police can 
pat-search a person whom the police reasonably suspect is armed 
and dangerous. State v. Roybal. 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986). 
The defendant has not offered any independent state 
constitutional analysis to show that the Utah constitutional 
standard of reasonable suspicion is more restrictive than the 
federal constitutional standard. In the absence of any 
independent state constitutional analysis the court must decide 
the defendant's constitutional challenge based solely on the 
federal reasonable suspicion standard. State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 
984, 988 (Utah App. 1994). 
"In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion. . ." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 
at 21-22. There is no bright line test that defines when there 
is or is not reasonable suspicion, rather reasonable suspicion is 
determined by the circumstances of each case. State v. Sykes. 
840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992). Reasonable suspicion can be 
met by a series of factors which individually are not enough to 
satisfy the standard. State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 
1985) . Furthermore, the knowledge and experience of the police 
4 
officer who detains a citizen must be considered when determining 
if reasonable suspicion existed to detain. United States v. 
Prignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 885 (1975). 
II* THERE WERE ARTICULABLE PACTS AND INFERENCES WHICH GAVE 
OFFICER SAVAGE REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS BOTH 
ARMED AND INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
1. Danger is inherent when a police officer executes an arrest 
warrant ^ the home of the arrestee. 
' * the iiati on have a] wa y s been sensi t i ve to the 
dangers presented to a police officer when making an arrest. In 
Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1, 8 the United States Supreme 
Court h e 1 d t h a t e • e i: } a i: r e s t m u s t b e p resume d t o p r e s e n t r I s k: o f 
danger to the arresting officers. In State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 
at 293-94, the Utah Supreme Court has voiced similar concerns of 
officez safely in nrrest. sit uations. In United States v. 
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that an arresting officer is always justified in a 
protective search of an arrestee's companion. While il ti e State 
does not argue for the Ninth Circuits absolute rule in this 
memorandum, the People do assert that the inherent danger of an 
arrest situation should be considered when deciding if there was 
reasonable suspicion to detain and pat-search. 
Officer Savage understood the heightened danger of an arrest 
warrant execution. In this particular case the risk of danger 
5 
was even greater because a prior attempt to execute the warrant 
forewarned the uncooperative occupants of the home that the 
police would likely come back and try again. Additionally, 
Officer Savage was in the rear of the home and it was dark. 
2. Officer Savage saw the defendant with Lamoreaux, a suspected 
drug dealer, and knew that weapons are frequent companions of 
drugs. 
In United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 161 (1992), the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a suspect's 
companionship with or propinquity to an individual independently 
suspected of criminal activity is a factor to be considered in 
assessing the reasonableness of a seizure." 
It is well known to any experienced police officer that 
"guns and drugs go together." Several courts including the 
United States Supreme Court, have noted the well recognized nexus 
between weapons, violence and drugs. Smith v. United States. 113 
S.Ct. 2050, 2060 (1993); United States v. Melendez-Garcia. 28 
F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994). 
Officer Savage knew that an arrest warrant for Lamoreaux had 
been issued for felony distribution of drugs. Officer Savage had 
observed Lamoreaux and the defendant together in a room in the 
home. It was reasonable for Officer Savage to expect that 
Lamoreaux was involved in drug sales and armed. It was also 
reasonable for Officer Savage to believe there was a possibility 
that Lamoreaux's companion, the defendant, would be involved in 
6 
drugs and armed as well. 
3. Officer Savage observed the defendant i 
retreat, and evasive behavior. 
In United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157 at 160 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "behavior which e vinces :i n 
the mind of a reasonable police officer an intent to flee from 
the po] i ce :i s sufficiently suspicious in and of itself to justify 
a temporary investigative stop by the police.11 (Citing 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3 (c)# at 69-70 & n. 164.1 (West 
1987 &: Sup -J ) . 
Prior to advising the defendant to return to the front of 
the home, Officer Savage noted that the behavior of the 
defendant, w.. - .• * ". red that the defendant 
was attempting t - apprehension by police. 
Furthermore, the defendant's retreat to the rear of the home 
could have attemp overtly regal n entrance i nto the 
home to obtain a weapon t< assault the officers on the scene. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case there was danger presented :i n execi iting the 
arrest warrant, granted however, this alone does not justify the 
detention of the defendant. Officer Savage also knew that 
Lamoreaux % wanted £ DI : cili: i lg sal es, that drugs an I firearms tend 
to run together, and that the defendant and Lamoreaux were 
associates. These additional facts still may not justify a 
detention and protective search of •- fendant Reasor 
7 
suspicion, in this case, is reached (in conjunction with the 
other factors) when Officer Savage observed the defendant's 
nervous and evasive behavior when confronted by the police. 
For the reasons expressed in this memorandum, the 
defendant's motion to suppress should be denied. 
DATED this (* day of ^ ^ ^ 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JQ&li L. ALLAN 
^Deputy Utah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress this ^l{^J) day of 
0/}Mjja/LL/^ 1996, to the following: 
Randy Spencer, Public Defender's Office 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 961400017 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Defendant, ROBERT W. THOMPSON, through his counsel of record, Randall K. 
Spencer, submits the following reply to the State's memorandum in opposition to Defendant's 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah conceded in its memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion 
that the encounter between Defendant and the officers in this case was a level two seizure 
which niiLsf be. jushl'ir:,J b" ' reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the sole question before the 
Court should be whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable 
articulable suspicion tllat Defendant was involved in criminal activity. However, at the 
suppression hearing, the State argued that reasonable suspicion was not the issue, and that the 
search was justified pursuant to a Terry frisk and the officer's need to secure an arrest scene. 
I. DEFENDANT WAS DETAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
A. The Officers Who Seized Defendant Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion to 
Justify the Seizure. 
Defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes at the time that he was 
confronted by Officer Savage and ordered to return to the custody of Officer Walker; 
therefore, in order to justify the seizure, the State must demonstrate that Officer Savage had 
reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant at that time. The only basis that the State can rely 
on to establish reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant is the fact that he was initially present 
at the home of another person suspected of criminal activity, and when Officer Walker 
confronted Defendant and Lamoreaux, Defendant left the scene in order to not be involved in 
the police encounter (Defendant did not "run" away in an attempt to flee from Officer 
Walker's presence). 
"There is no bright line test for what constitutes reasonable suspicion." State v. 
Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah App. 1991). In order to determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion to seize a 
defendant, Courts must engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis. Id (citing United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989)). The totality of the circumstances analysis must 
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being seized is engaged in criminal activity. Id. 
(citing Steward. 806 P.2d at 215; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). The 
facts of the present case seem clear that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
seize and search Defendant, and furthermore, at the suppression hearing, the State did not 
dispute the Defense's position that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize and 
search Defendant. 
Additionally, the State's initial reliance on United States v. Berrvhill. 445 F.2d 
limited frisk for weapons may be appropriate. LI at 30. The Terrv court made it clear that 
inarticulate hunches are not sufficient to justify a search, and that an officer must reasonably 
conclude that the unusual conduct he observes suggests probable criminal activity and danger. 
IdL at 30. In light of the Terrv standard, the Utah Supreme Court found in State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) that furtive gestures and fidgeting actions are 
mere hunches and not an articulatable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 
("omisell ten Dcfernijiiiii was run able to find any case law which wou . t the 
State's position that the officers always have the right to search everyone present in order to 
secure the arrest scene. The closest argument which would support the State's position is the 
"automatic companion" rule which was discussed in dictum in the Berrvhill case, but has 
since been disavowed by the Ninth Circuit and the vast majority of the other circuits. 
Therefore, the analysis which is applicable to the present case must be at least a reasonable-
ness analysis. In fact, if the officer's had the right to search everyone present at the scene of 
an arrest regardless of v 'hethe i: there was reasonable suspicioi i , it would g'v e officers 
unbridled ability to search any number of people who may be present while the officers are 
effectuating the arrest of one singular person. 
In the present case, the officers search of Defendant was not reasonable under the 
circumstances: the officers did not have any reasonable suspicion that Defendant (or 
Lamoreaux for that matter) was involved in criminal activity at the time of the encounter; the 
officers had absolutely no information that Defendant had ever been involved in criminal 
activity; Defendant left the scene of the arrest of Lamoreaux and was oi il] brought back by 
the command of the officer Savage; Officer Savage did not fear for his safety such that he 
deemed it appropriate to search Defendant; after Officer Walker completed his arrest of 
1189 (9th Cir. 1971) is unfounded. The facts in Berrvhill are distinguishable-in Berrvhill. 
the companion of an arrestee had her hand bag searched which is significantly different than 
the search of a person as in the present case. Moreover, the holding in Berrvhill. has been 
subsequently criticized by not only the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which initially decided 
Berrvhill. but also by other federal circuit courts. United States v. Flippin. 924 F.2d 163 
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Flett. 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Tharpe. 526 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bell. 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985).l 
B. The Officer's Did Not Have the Right to Search Defendant in Order to 
Secure the Scene 
At the suppression hearing, after essentially conceding that the officer's did not 
have reasonable suspicion to justify the search of Defendant, the State relied on an assertion 
that the officer's had a right to search Defendant in order to secure the scene pursuant to 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its prodigy. In Terry, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that the Fourth Amendment unquestionably protects suspects subjected to 
investigatory stops, and that each frisk must be "justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id at 
20. The Court further held that in order for a frisk to be reasonable, an officer must: (1) 
observe unusual conduct which he interprets "in light of his experience" as indicating 
possible criminal activity and present danger, (2) identify himself as a policeman and make 
reasonable inquiries in the course of investigating the suspicious behavior, and (3) if nothing 
in the initial stages of the encounter dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other's safety, a 
lTwo circuits have expressed some approval of Berrvhill in dictum. United States v. 
Poms. 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Simmons. 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977). 
Lamoreaux, he then approached Defendant who vi.s N.'iiiin^ with Officer Savage ,uu1 kjMii 
questioning him and subsequently searched his person. By the time that Officer Walker got 
amutiil m seaalniif' 1 Jffendani .my reasonable basis which may (for the sake of argument) 
have justified a search of Defendant's person at the outset of the encounter had dissipated. 
Not only did the officers have no right to search Defendant, they had no right to detain him 
either at the initial encounter or subsequently. Therefore, the evidence which was seized 
from Defendant pursuant to the illegal seizure and search of Defendant must be suppressed. 
II. DEFENDANT WAS SEIZED AND SEARCHED II i I-1, Al ,1 ""! PI 'KSU AN'I I <l1 
ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Although the language of Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution is nearly the same 
as its counterpart, the Fourth Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has found that Article I, 
§ 14 provides even greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than the 
Fourth Amendment. In State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a police officer could not open the door of a parked car to inspect the vehicle 
identification number; this holding was in opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in 
New York v. Class. 475 U.S. 106 (1986). Also, in State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 416-
18 (Ut Supreme Court held that a depositor has an expectation of privacy 
in his bank records pursuant to Article I, § 14 which was in opposition to the U.S. Supreme 
Court's ruling regarding the same issue under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
In light of the Utah Supreme Court's tendency to interpret Article I, §14 of the 
Utah Constitution in a more na* ner than the Fourth A m< mi Iment foi the reasons 
discussed in the cases cited above, it is very unlikely that the Utah Supreme Court would 
adopt the "automatic companion" concept which has been highly criticized by not only the 
Ninth Circuit which initially introduced the idea, but also by the vast majority of the other 
federal circuit courts (especially in light of the fact that allowing officers to search people 
present at the scene of an arrest would open the door for officers to conduct unbridled 
searches of anyone who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time). Furthermore, 
in State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated ". . .a 
person's mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable cause to 
search does not provide probable cause to search that person." [sic] "Nor are police officers 
authorized to search an individual merely because that person is present on premises for 
which a search has been authorized." IdL at 1383. 
In order for an officer to justify a search of Defendant's person, he must first be 
able to justify the initial detention of Defendant. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 30. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined three levels of police encounters together with the standard for 
justifying such a detention: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspi-
cion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; how-
ever, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer than is neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). There is no exception to the Fourth 
Amendment or Article I, § 14 which allows a seizure and search of a person to "secure an 
arrest scene" as the State asserts. Therefore, any search of Defendant must be analyzed 
pursuant to Terry as it has been adopted in Utah law relative to searches and seizures. 
Under the facts of the present case, the officers compelled Defendant to return to the arrest 
scene which must be considered a level two stop, and because the officers did not have an 
articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity, the detention of 
Defendant violated Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Furthermore, even after 
Defendant was seized pursuant to a level two encounter, the officers must reasonably believe 
that Defendant poses a danger to themselves or others in order to ji istify a 1 erry ln:.k ;ial ;r, 
discussed above, in the previous memorandum, and at the suppression hearing, the officers 
did not have an objective!) i easonable belief that Defendant posed a danger to themselves or 
others. Therefore, notwithstanding the illegal seizure of Defendant, it was improper for the 
officers to search Defendant absent a reasonable articulable belief that Defendant was armed 
or posed a danger to the officers or others. See Terry. 392 U.S. 1. 
In light of all the facts in the present case together with the arguments presented in 
Defendant's initial memorandi u i 1. the suppression hearing, and this memorandum, the 
evidence seized from Defendant's person was fruit of an illegal seizure and search and must 
be suppressed. 
Dated this
 t J S day of February, 1996 
landall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office 
of the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this 0^> 
d^ y of_ Zp&MJVcA 1996. 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JOHN L. ALLAN #5032 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ROBERT N THOMPSON# 
Defendant, 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
DEFENSE'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No 961400017 
(Judge Guy R. Burningham) 
COMES NOW, , t y a nd thr oi lgl I ii ts • counsel J ohn L. 
Allan, and hereby responds to Defendant's Response Memorandum as 
follows: 
Again the ctetensi,1 has completely missed the iiHistie in I hu--J 
case. The key words in the defense's arguments are "reasonable 
suspicion" and "search". The defense has again failed to deal with 
the issues a! IIHIHI III l III HI ntalLei; "Officer Safety" a nd "securi nq 
an arrest scene". 
DATED this 2*> day of _ ^ ^ ^ 1996 
/ J/£-
JQHN L. ALLAN 
iputy Utah County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Reply Memorandum to Defense's Motion to Suppress this 
?uih day of ^jJyiiM/iij , 1996 to the following: 
Randy Spencer, Attorney lor Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'<*< ' 
'C-c ' o, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 961400017 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the file, considered 
the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
RULING 
FINDING OF FACTS 
On December 17, 1995, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Officers Bud Walker and Dray 
Savage went to the home of Timothy Lamoreaux to serve an arrest warrant on him. The 
warrant had been issued for felony distribution of drugs. Officer Walker went to the front 
door of the mobile home in which Lamoreaux lived, while Officer Savage went to the rear to 
cover the back door. As Officer Walker approached the front door, Lamoreaux and 
Defendant exited the home; at that point, Officer Walker informed Lamoreaux of the arrest 
warrant and handcuffed him. 
45 
Officer Walker ordered Defendant to remain nearby, but Defendant slowly walked 
toward the other side of the home, into the shadows. Officer Savage met Defendant in the 
dark and ordered him to return to the front of the home where Officer Walker and 
Lamoreaux were located. One week prior to the arrest, Officer Walker had been involved in 
a drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic weapons were seized. In addition, the officers 
testified that drugs and guns were commonly seized together. Because Officer Walker was 
concerned for his safety, he conducted a pat-down frisk of Defendant's outer clothing, 
during which time Officer Walker asked Defendant whether anything could harm him as he 
frisked Defendant. Defendant responded that he had syringes in his jacket pocket. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officers' restraint of Defendant was initially for their safety. Based on the 
warrant for Lamoreaux's arrest and on the officers' previous encounters with drugs and 
guns, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may pose a threat to their safety. 
2. Officer Walker's pat down frisk of Defendant was therefore conducted for 
officer safety. 
3- Pursuant to the requirements outlined by Terry v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) 
and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Officer Walker's pat down frisk 
was justified and therefore valid. 
4. Also, because the officers were effecting a valid arrest of Lamoreaux, they 
were justified in securing the arrest scene, which included the yard area in which Defendant 
was detained. In securing the scene for officer safety, the pat down frisk was further 
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5. Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S.Ct 1602 (1966) and State Y, SfrggtCT, 
900 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), before conducting a custodial interrogation, arresting 
officers must apprise a defendant of several constitutional rights. Officer Walker's pre-
Miranda question was not to interrogate Defendant; rather, he posed the question to insure 
his own personal safety. The question and resulting answer, therefore, did not violate 
Miranda's protections. 
6. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is therefore DENIED. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this / / day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
KM 
cc: RANDALL K. SPENCER 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
JOHN L. ALLAN 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JOHN L. ALLAN #5032 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i 
ORDER 
: 
i Case No. 961400017 FS 
(Judge Guy R. Burningham) 
COMES NOW the Court, having made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated March 11, 1996, and pursuant to those 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereby enters the following 
order: 
1. Evidence obtained from the defendant on December 17, 1995, 
by Provo Police officers was obtained lawfully pursuant to the 
officer's necessity of securing an arrest scene. The pat down 
frisk performed on the defendant was lawful pursuant to the 
guidelines set out in Terry v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) and State 
v. White. 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
2. Pre-Miranda questions by the arresting officers to the 
defendant were not to interrogate, but to in insure officer safety. 
Therefore the officer's question and the defendant's response did 
not violate the guidelines set out in Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S. Ct 
1602 (1966). 
3. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
from the defendant by Provo Police officers on December 17# 1995# 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V S . 
ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON, 
Defendant. 
is therefore denied. 
DATED this 2-/ day of 
Dprovedflws to/Form 
Randy Spencer, Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I did mail a true andjcorregt copy of 
the above and foregoing Order this iQ'Ul day of 
1996, to the following: 
Randy Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tab 3 
RANDALL K. SPENCER (6992) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON, 
Defendant. 
: CONDITIONAL (SERY) PLEA AGREEMENT 
: AND CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 961400017 
Judge GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
COMES NOW Defendant, ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON, through his attorney of record, 
Randall K. Spencer, and the State of Utah, by and through its attorney, John L. Allan, Deputy Utah 
County Attorney, who hereby stipulate, and agree as follows: 
1. Defendant is charged in Count I of the Information filed in this matter with Possession of 
Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, and in Count II with Possession of 
Methamphetamine, a Third Degree Felony (Count III was dismissed upon entry of plea to counts I 
and II). 
2. Defendant has filed his Motion to Suppress supported by Memorandum, challenging both 
the detention of Defendant and the search of his person. 
3. An evidentiary hearing was held on February 14, 1996 where the Court generally found 
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the facts stated in the State's memorandum and the Defendant's memorandum to be true. After 
considering the facts of this matter and the arguments presented by the State and Defendant, this 
Court has denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and found that the officer's actions were 
appropriate in order to secure the arrest scene and pursuant to a terry frisk. 
4. The State of Utah, in the interest of justice has agreed to dismiss Count III in 
consideration of Defendant's conditional plea of guilty to the amended charges listed in paragraph 
one. 
5. The conditions of Defendant's plea are those allowed by the holding of State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to wit: 
a) Defendant's plea specifically preserves the issues raised in his Motion to Suppress 
for appeal. 
b) Defendant may withdraw his plea if his arguments for suppression are accepted by 
the appropriate appellate court. 
c) The disposition of Defendant's appeal will effectively bring the litigation of this 
matter to an end: (1) if Defendant is successful in his appeal he will be allowed to withdraw his plea 
and the State of Utah will dismiss all counts filed against him, or (2), while if Defendant is not 
successful in his appeal Defendants pleas of guilt will remain on his record; 
d) No other issues remain unresolved in this matter which would prevent this case 
from being totally and finally resolved upon a determination of Defendant's appeal of this Court's 
denial of his Motion to Suppress. 
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Dated this £_ day of April, 1996. 
j^dflL-
L. Allan Randall K. Spencer 
)eputy Utah County Attorney Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATION 
Consistent with State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. App. 1988), State v. Montova. 858 P.2d 
1027 (Utah App. 1993), State v. Harris. 858 p.2d 1031 (Ut. App. 1993), and State v. Rivera. 871 
P.2d 1023 (Ut. App. 1994), this Court hereby certifies that the foregoing Conditional Plea 
Agreement entered into by and between the State of Utah and Defendant, Robert Wells Thompson, 
is in the interests of justice and further that such plea will effectively bring litigation in this matter 
to an end, in that if Defendant is successful in his appeal, he will be allowed to withdraw his plea 
and the State of Utah will dismiss all counts filed against him, while if Defendant is not successful 
in his appeal, judgment will be entered against him in accordance with his plea. 
Such plea is accordingly approved and adopted by this Court and Defendant has hereby 
reserved his right to appeal this Court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this >#~"dav of April, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
